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Abstract: 
This article proposes a “third way” in the philosophy of time beyond A-theory and the block
universe, in which time is understood as a purely local phenomenon. It does so by starting
with simple metaphysical assumptions about substances and their properties. Based on these
assumptions,  the  notions  of  “before”,  of  change,  and of  time as  a  local  quantification  of
change can be derived non-circularly, i.e. without invoking temporal concepts. I then proceed
to prove the irreversibility of local time by showing that the propositional content of the local
past cannot be changed, since this would imply a contradiction, whereas that of the future can.
Time’s familiar asymmetric character, in particular the difference between the fixed past and
the open or “branching” future, is therefore a non-illusory but purely local phenomenon. Such
a  model  requires  no  past-present-future  distinction  valid  for  the  entire  cosmos,  and  is
therefore consistent with special and general relativity. The article furthermore explores the
implications of this model for the notion of an evolving universe.
1. Introduction
Ever  since  the  advent  of  relativity  theory,  there  has  been  an  ongoing  discussion  on  its
implications for the philosophy of time. Unresolved questions remain, of which this article
focuses on the following: Can a robust distinction between past and future be upheld, or is
such a distinction illusory, or at least of no ontological significance? As conscious agents, we
experience a clear difference between a determinate past, which can be neither changed nor
revisited, and an open, “branching” future which can still be influenced. In everyday life, we
tend to assume, as Aristotle did, that the truth values of propositions about the past are fixed,
whereas  propositions  about  the  future  have  no  truth  values.1 The  existence  of  a  mind-
independent  distinction  between  the  past  and  the  future,  and  of  a  global  present  which
constantly changes, so that future events become present ones, which then become past ones,
is the central tenet of the A-theory of time. The global present comprises events which are
simultaneous, i.e. which happen at the same time. Hence, A-theory requires an ontologically
privileged parameter t by which all events can be ordered. Only then can equivalence classes
 This paper has been submitted to Synthese in July 2017. 
1 See De interpretatione, 19a,1-19b,4; and Ethica Nicomachea, 1139b, 6-11.
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be construed which define the set of events occurring at any given time t, and hence also the
set of events occurring now.  B-theory, while denying that pastness, presentness and futurity
are  mind-indepedendent  properties  of  events,  likewise  holds,  at  least  in  its  classical
formulation, that for all events, there is an objective fact about which events precede which,
and  which  events  are  simultaneous.  In  other  words,  B-theory,  like  A-theory,  assumes  an
ontologically privileged total ordering of all events. But, as is well known, special relativity
theory undermines  the  notion  of  such a  privileged  ordering:  it  follows  from the  Lorentz
transformations that, if an observer O’ moves past another, O, at a fraction β of the speed of
light, then the plane of simultaneity for O’ has a slope β relative to the plane of simultaneity
for  O  in a Minkowski diagram of flat spacetime.2 Thus, the temporal ordering of spatially
separated events is not absolute, but depends on the frame of reference. Special  relativity
therefore undermines not only A-theory, but also B-theory.  
Can the intuitive view of time be reconciled with spacetime physics? The answers given in the
contemporary literature about this question can be broadly divided into three types: “cosmic
A-theory”, according to which there is a global now, i.e. a past-present-future distinction valid
for the entire cosmos; the block universe, according to which there is no such distinction of
any mind-independent significance; and a small body of literature promoting a “third way”
whereby this distinction is real, but local rather than global. 
The first view, which I termed “cosmic A-theory”, has the advantage of saving the intuitively
obvious features of the passage of time. Its representatives include William L. Craig (2001),
Dean W. Zimmerman (2013), and Thomas M. Crisp (2003), to name only a few. Recently,
Roberto M. Unger and Lee Smolin (2015) have argued forcefully that a preferred global time
is necessary in order to account both for the evolving, changing universe, and for time as
experienced by agents. To this end, Smolin proposes giving up the relativity of simultaneity,
and looking for experimental evidence of violations of Lorentz-invariance [Unger and Smolin
(2015,  pp.  414-421  and  pp.  491-2)].  Cosmic  A-theorists  have  advanced  several  ways  of
defining absolute simultaneity in spite of relativity theory, employing, for example, a neo-
Lorentzian interpretation of special relativity [see Craig (2001, ch. 9), cf. also Tooley (1997 ,
pp. 344-354)], or arguing from simultaneity in quantum mechanics, in particular from the
collapse  of  a  wave  function  describing  an  entangled  system  of  two  spatially  separated
particles, as occurs in Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiments [see Craig (2001, pp. 223-
235), and D. W. Zimmerman (2013, pp. 80-1)]. Here is not the place to discuss these moves in
detail. They arguably both fail: the neo-Lorentzian interpretation of special relativity incurs
the high—in my view too high—cost of giving up the frame independence of the laws of
nature.  The argument from EPR experiments to absolute simultaneity leads to what Craig
Callender has termed an “irresolvable coordination problem” (2008, p. 13) between the frame
of reference in which the experiment is carried out and the assumed privileged frame which,
according to proponents of absolute simultaneity, defines the locus of wave function collapse.3
2 See any textbook on relativity, e.g. Cheng (2010, pp. 53-4). 
3 Cf. J. Lucas’ “hyperplane advancing throughout the whole universe of collapse into  eigen-ness” [Mellor &
Lucas (1998, p. 55)]. 
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But cosmic A-theorists  have another interesting argument to offer:  that from the evolving
universe revealed to us by contemporary cosmology. If the universe goes through different
stages of its existence, marked by different characteristics, it would at first sight seem that the
notion  of  “the  universe  at  time  t”  is  not  only  viable,  but  also  necessary  for  scientific
cosmology. Indeed, this is one of the key motivations for Unger and Smolin’s proposal.4 The
evolving cosmos seems to restore a necessary condition for the truth of A-theory, so that it
might seem that we can unproblematically speak of “the universe now” after all. 
However, in my view, evolutionary cosmology does not restore an ontologically privileged
temporal  parameter  which  could  be  used  to  order  all  events  in  spacetime,  and  which  is
necessary in order to define the global now as the boundary between the past and the future.
Accounts of the evolution of the observable universe are given in terms of so-called cosmic
time  functions,  which  are  constructed  on  the  simplifying  assumption  that  the  universe  is
everywhere  homogenous  and  isotropic.  This  assumption,  which  leads  to  the  Robertson-
Walker metric, is experimentally confirmed for very large scales. It then emerges that each
observer  at  rest  relative  to  the  cosmic  fluid—known  as  a  “fundamental  observer”—will
measure, for the same local time  t after the Big Bang, the same parameters describing the
characteristics of her cosmic vicinity at a very large scale. These parameters include pressure,
matter  and radiation density,  curvature,  Hubble’s  constant,  Ωmatter  and ΩΛ.5 By putting the
observations of fundamental observers together to form an atlas, macroscopic states of the
universe,  i.e.  states  defined  by the  above  parameters,  can  then  be  correlated  to  times  as
measured by fundamental observers. Thus, a total ordering of such states isomorphic to the
positive real line is obtained. This finding is of great philosophical interest in its own right,
but it only applies to a rough, macroscopic description of large portions of space. Events in
spacetime  such  as  collisions  between  astronomical  bodies,  football  matches,  musical
performances,  and  so  on,  happen  at  a  much  smaller  scale.  Here,  special  and  general
relativistic  effects  come  into  play:  clocks  tick  at  different  rates  relatively  to  each  other,
depending on their state of motion and the gravitational potential in which they are situated.
This precludes the possibility of ordering all events occurring in spacetime by a preferred
temporal parameter. For this reason, I submit that evolutionary cosmology does not restore the
global passage of time advocated by the cosmic A-theorists.   
The most well-known alternative is the block-universe view, whereby the distinction between
past, present and future is of no ontological significance. This has usually been taken to imply
a  universal  determinism  whereby  the  truth  values  of  propositions  about  the  future  are
determinate, just like those of propositions about the past, as argued in the by now classical
papers by Wim Rietdijk (1966) and Hilary Putnam (1967). We find a similar picture of the
future as “just there” in the thought of Arthur Eddington (1920, pp. 46-7). Likewise, Olivier
Costa de Beauregard (1981) took the lack of a global present to imply that the future light
cone of agents in spacetime is “inscribed” (pp. 429-430) and “written down” (p. 432). On this
picture, the content of the future light cone cannot be influenced. More examples could be
4 See e.g. pp. x –xi in the introduction of their book.
5 i.e. the fractional contribution of matter and cosmological constant, respectively, to the total mass-energy of the
universe. For a detailed discussion of cosmic time, see Whitrow (1963, ch. 5); Cheng (2010, ch. 9); and Hawking
(1969). 
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cited, but perhaps the most succinct argument to the effect that relativity theory renders a
robust notion of the passage of time impossible was put by Kurt Gödel:
It seems that one obtains an unequivocal proof for the view of those philosophers who, like Parmenides, Kant,
and the modern idealists, deny the objectivity of change and consider change as an illusion or an appearance due
to our special mode of perception. The argument runs as follows: Change becomes possible only through the
lapse of time. The lapse of time, however, means (or at least, is equivalent to the fact) that reality consists of an
infinity of layers of “now” which come into existence successively. But, if simultaneity is something relative …
reality cannot be split up into such layers in an objectively determined way. Each observer has his own set of
“nows”, and none of these various systems of layers can claim the prerogative of representing the objective lapse
of time. [Gödel (1990, pp. 202-3)]
The block universe, while compatible with relativity theory, has the obvious disadvantage of
failing to account for the asymmetric character of time which is so manifest from everyday
experience,  in  particular  the  difference  between  the  indeterminate  future  and  the  fixed,
unchangeable past. Not surprisingly, a squarely static worldview where nothing happens and
everything is just “there” seems to have few defenders today, and contemporary proponents of
the block universe emphasize that their view does not amount to an altogether unchanging
world [see e.g. Skow (2015), cf. also Price (1996, pp. 12-13)].
There is currently only little in the direction of a “third way” which reconciles the experienced
features of the passage of time with spacetime physics. Examples include: Steven Savitt’s
proposal (2011) whereby change is real, but the tensed structure of time is an essentially local
phenomenon; the theory of “branching space-time” developed by Nuel Belnap (1992) and
then further,  for  example,  by Thomas Müller  (2012);  Robert  J.  Russell’s  (2012) move of
understanding past, present, and future as relations between, rather than properties of, events;
and James Harrington’s theses whereby an Aristotelian theory of time opens the possibility of
a non-illusory passage of time independently of a global time (2009), and whereby the proper
time measured locally along an individual worldline “just is time” (2007, p. 12).
The approach I will propose falls within the family of “third way” views on which there is a
robust  local  past-future distinction,  but  no global  present.  In its  Aristotelian outlook,  it  is
particularly close to Harrington’s work on the subject. The novel contribution I wish to offer
is a rigorous derivation of local time from simple assumptions concerning substances and
their  causal  interactions.  I  will  present  the  case  that  temporal  notions  can  be  derived
operationally and non-circularly from non-temporal ones. Therefore, it  is not necessary to
presuppose an absolute time which exists independently of interactions between substances.
In line with Aristotle, we can thus defend the claim that change gives rise to time, not vice-
versa as  Gödel  assumed.  To this  end,  in  section  2,  operational  definitions  of  the relation
“before”,  of  change,  and  finally  of  time  itself  will  be  developed.  In  section  3,  an
epistemological assumption is made whereby we can infer the truth of some propositions from
records contained in substances. Based on this groundwork, I then present, in section 4, a new
argument in order to show why the local past is fixed and unchangeable, whereas the local
future is open. This yields a branching structure of time as a real phenomenon, albeit a local
one which is independent of a global passage of time, thereby providing a fresh approach to
understanding the problem of the “arrow” of time, i.e.  of time’s one-way-street character.
Section  5  is  devoted  to  a  detailed  discussion  of  objections  to  this  model,  as  well  as
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comparisons to other related models. Finally, in section 6, the outline of a physically correct
model of time beyond A-theory and the block universe will be sketched. 
2. Constructing local time
I propose constructing a concept of time in terms of local causal interactions through the
following  steps:  First,  a  definition  of  the  temporal  ordering  relation  “before”  will  be
developed. I claim that this is possible in a non-circular way. This will allow us to define the
notion of change in substances, and in a next step, to introduce a neo-Aristotelian concept of
time as a quantification of change through a measuring standard. 
2.1 Defining “before” non-circularly
The first  step,  i.e.  defining  “before”  non-circularly,  is  based  on two simple  metaphysical
assumptions: 
A.1: Substances exist,  and they can exist in different states characterized by non-essential
intrinsic properties. 
Thus, if A is a substance, then there are non-essential intrinsic properties p for A, i.e. intrinsic
properties  such  that  A is  identical  to  itself  whether  or  not  it  possesses  p.  For  any such
properties p, A-with-p and A-without-p will be called “states” of A.
 A.2: For any substance A, different states of it exist only if it is subject to causal interactions,
either with its environment, or among its own parts. 
On this assumption, some non-essential intrinsic properties of substances are due to causal
interactions. We can therefore term such properties “records”, and substances, as the bearers
of these properties, can be thought of as “recorders”. I leave open whether substances also
have non-essential intrinsic properties which are not records.
In order to see how assumptions (A.1) and (A.2) help us to construct a non-circular definition
of “before”, consider a simple physical object A being affected causally by its environment in
the course of two separate events. With each event, a record on A is associated. Let’s call the
two records on A “Alice” and “Fred”. Notice that, if the event associated with Fred is before
that associated with Alice, then a state of A exists with Fred and without Alice, and another
state exists with both Fred and Alice, but there is no state with Alice and without Fred. Thus,
we find that, in the scenario under consideration, there is an asymmetry  in the existence of
states of A: the situation would be symmetric if there were also a state of A with Alice, but
without Fred.
The crucial point in the above example is that an asymmetry in the existence of states of A
needs no temporal concepts in order to define it. Rather, we need only to quantify, timelessly,
over actually existing states of A in order to determine which of the two events is before the
other.      
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Of course, in practice nothing guarantees that properties of A due to causal interactions will
stick. In the above example, Fred could be deleted again, so that we would be left with a state
of A with Alice and without Fred, in which case the asymmetry in the existence of states of A
breaks  down.  This  situation  can  be  remedied  by  introducing  the  notion  of  an  amended
recorder: 
D.1: An amended recorder is a recorder A such that each event affecting it produces a record
in A, and does not affect other records in A. 
Note that I do not demand that records “stay” or “do not become destroyed” in A. To do so
would be to circularly invoke concepts which involve temporal precedence. Instead, I chose a
formulation which does without such concepts.  
However, the amended recorder needs a further improvement in order to attain a non-circular
definition of “before”: we need to ensure that each event affecting  A  is associated with a
unique record. For if the records produced by two distinct events are not unique, the later one
of two events affecting  A can produce a property which is already in  A,  in which case the
above asymmetry in the existence of states of the recorder  A once again breaks down. An
example  of  this  case  could  be  a  camera  which  records  two  indiscernible  pictures  of  a
landscape. Let’s call  r* the record produced twice in  A in the course of two distinct events.
We notice that, even in such cases, there is still an important difference between these events:
one of them is associated with the production of r* in a state A-with-r* , and the other with the
production of r* in a state A-without-r*. This difference can, however, only be made out by a
recorder which is able to monitor its own states, i.e. to tell in which state, characterized by
which records, it exists. Such a recorder will therefore be called an “ideal recorder”:
D.2: An ideal recorder is an amended recorder which is able to fully specify its own state.
Thus, for an ideal recorder, there will be two distinct instances of r* , which could be labeled,
for example r*a  and r*b, even if these two records are intrinsically indiscernible. Each event
affecting A is therefore associated with a unique record. 
It is now possible to define the relation “before” between events. Let x and y be two events
associated with the production of two properties, rx and ry , in an ideal recorder A. Then, 
D.3: x is before y iff there is a state of A with rx, and a state with rx and ry, but no state with ry
and without rx.   
We now have an operational definition of “before” which does without temporal concepts,
and which therefore does not need to assume an absolute time, existing independently of
substances and events, as ontologically primitive. Of course, readers may wonder whether a
definition  which  involves  the  concept  of  an  ideal  recorder  is  of  much  use,  since  such
substances do not in fact exist. My answer to this objection is that there are substances in the
world  we  know  which  approximate  the  ideal  recorder  very  well.  Such  substances  can
therefore be used for establishing the relation “before” between events in a highly reliable
way by applying the criterion in definition (D.3) to them. For example, even simple physical
objects like the moon can be used quite well to establish the order of impact events on it, by
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quantifying timelessly over its states. The human cognitive apparatus saves records within the
brain, protecting them from interaction with the environment, and is therefore a particularly
good amended recorder. It has the additional ability of being able to monitor its own states,
albeit of course imperfectly. This enables us to identify distinct instances of sense impressions
which  are  intrinsically  indiscernible,  so  that  we  approximate  the  ideal  recorder  well.
Furthermore, even though in imperfect recorders, some records of events become deleted, it is
still possible to carry out a comparison with records contained in other recorders, in order to
infer  what  an  ideal  recorder  would  record.  On  this  basis,  a  relationship  of  temporal
precedence, as defined in (D.3), can be established. 
Note also that, even though I defined “before” in terms of a quantification over all states of an
ideal recorder, this quantification does not need to be carried out explicitly. This is because
every event affecting the ideal recorder  A is associated with a unique record, and does not
interfere with other records. Hence, given only two states of A, such as A-with-rx (without ry),
and A-with-rx -and-ry, we can be certain that there is no state A-with-ry (without rx). Thus, we
do not need an overview over all states of  A in order to verify whether definition (D.3) is
satisfied. This is consonant with everyday experience where, having witnessed two events, we
can immediately judge which is before which. To form this judgment, we do not have to await
the end of our life in order to quantify over all our states.
2.2 Change
Suppose that a substance  B is within the causal reach of an ideal, or approximately ideal,
recorder  A, and that there are two states of  B:  B-without-p  and  B-with-p. These states can
affect  A,  for example by emitting electromagnetic  waves,  and produce two corresponding
records in  A,  which will be called  rB-without-p  and  rB-with-p  .  This allows defining the notion of
change in a substance: 
D.4 A substance B changes iff it acquires or loses a property p, where “B acquires p” iff rB-
without-p is before rB-with-p for A, and “B loses p” iff rB-with-p is before rB-without-p for A.
Because “before” is defined via the ideal recorder A, and because B is a substance which is
not necessarily an ideal recorder, we cannot define the change of B in terms of B alone. This
poses no problem, since there is never a danger that A gets the order between the states of B
wrong. In other words, whatever A’s location or state of motion, A cannot measure a different
order  from  that  which  would  be  measured  by  an  ideal  recorder  whose  worldline  is
immediately next  to  B’s.  For this  latter  order  is  an invariant,  as is  known from relativity
theory, and so it is the same in A’s frame of reference. Because of this, the events which are
associated with the production of the records rB-without-p  and rB-with-p  in A must likewise occur in
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the same order.6 Hence, if “B acquires p” or “B loses p” according to some ideal recorder, then
the same is true according to any ideal recorder.     
2.3 Local time
Since an ideal recorder can mark two instances of a record r* as distinct, it should be possible
to construct a local parameter t based on repeated instances of r*. I propose doing this in the
following way:  Let  A  be an ideal  recorder,  or  a  sufficiently good approximation  thereof.
Suppose that A is in a state with r*a and r*b. Then, the collection of r*a and r*b can be thought
of as a record in its own right, which will be called r*2. A state of A with r*2 can be affected in
such a way as to produce yet another instance of r* in it. The collection of r*2 and r* can then
be called r*3, and so forth. This is a procedure of successive inclusion similar to that used in
the standard set-theoretical construction of the natural numbers [see e.g. Holmes (2012, pp.
25-6)] except that we start, not with the empty set, but with a single instance of r*, whose first
successor is r*2 .   
We can then identify the index of r*i as the local parameter t measured by A:
D.5: If A is an ideal recorder, or a sufficiently good approximation thereof, then for all r*i  in
A, i ≡ t .  
The local natural parameter can then be subdivided further by some other repeated change in
A,  thereby yielding  a  rational  parameter,  on  the  basis  of  which  a  real  parameter  can  be
constructed, at least in thought, e.g. by the standard procedure of defining real numbers in
terms of sets of rational numbers [see e.g. Holmes (2012, pp. 94-6)]. Let’s continue to call this
refined parameter t. We can then write states of A as At, i.e. we can identify them by this local
parameter, rather than by the records they contain. By writing A-with-rx simply as Ax, where x
is an event and rx the record in A associated with it, this identification reads:
I.1: At = Ax1,…,xn , for some n.
In other words, At contains records of finitely many events. 
Writing states  of  A  as  At also  allows assigning records  in  A  to  the local  parameter  t,  by
defining:
D.6: If a record r is produced in At , then r ≡ rt .
6 At any rate, this is true in a special relativistic context, as can be seen from a simple calculation: Suppose that
B changes from green to red, and that, as it does so, it rushes towards  A at a very high speed  v. Let  x  be the
distance between A and B, according to A’s frame of reference, when the process of change starts and when B
sends off a message  “B is green”. Let  Δτ be the proper time for the process of change as measured along B’s
worldline, and let Δt be the time for this process according to A’s frame of reference. As is known from special
relativity, if Δτ is positive, so is Δt. Let t=0, according to A’s frame, when the message “B is green” is sent off
from B. This message arrives at A at time tgreen = x/c. B is at a distance of (x – v·Δt), again according to A’s frame,
when the message “B is red” is sent off. This message arrives at A at tred = Δt + (x – v·Δt)/c. Thus tred – tgreen = (1 –
v/c)·Δt. This interval can be an arbitrarily small fraction of Δt, but it can never be negative, and so A receives the
two signals in the correct order. 
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On the  basis  of  what  has  been  developed  throughout  section  2  so  far,  I  propose  a  neo-
Aristotelian definition of time:
D.7:  Time is a local parameter  t established through a recorder  A on the basis of repeated
instances of records of the same type  r*  in  A,  such that  t  is used to quantify processes of
change in substances which can causally affect A.   
Registering change in substances and establishing the local parameter t can only be done by a
substance  A sufficiently close to an ideal recorder. Such a substance can quantify changes
either in itself or in other substances. In the latter case, the quantification can be carried out in
different ways. The simplest way is to use the temporal indices  t  of records  rt in  A which
correspond to changes in A's surroundings. Alternatively, change can be quantified from these
indices in combination with additional information, in particular about the distance between A
and  substances  which  can  affect  it.7 In  the  limit  of  small  distances  or  a  high  speed  of
propagation of causal influence, the results of both methods of quantification will coincide.
This leads to the impression that there is a “world at time  t”, i.e. that an entire state of the
world corresponds to a locally measured time, as was generally thought before the advent of
relativity theory [cf. Russell (2012, pp. 263-5)].   
Some readers may be concerned that a repeated process is not sufficient to establish a local
time  standard,  but  that  the  process  also  needs  to  occur  regularly.  However,  in  my view,
regularity only becomes an issue when several repeated processes come into play, whose rate
with respect to each other may vary. If there is only one such process, then there is no way of
quantifying the intervals defined by it, and of comparing their duration. Hence, this process
alone is sufficient to define a unit of time.8
3. Epistemological realism
In view of deriving the irreversibility of local time in section 3, one more premise is needed: I
will assume that from records in a recorder  A (which need not necessarily be ideal, or even
amended), conclusions can be drawn about the truth of propositions. This is done with the
help of rules of inference  v,  the set of which I will call  V.  Let  RA  denote a set containing
records rA in A. Then, we can assume: 
A.3: From the fact that the rules v ∈ V apply, and from the existence of records rA ∈ RA , it
follows that some propositions pRA are true, the set of which will be called PRA .
7 as is done in the Einstein synchronization procedure, described in (Taylor & Wheeler 1992, pp. 37-9).
8 Cf. the similar observations made by Francisco Suárez (1965, sect. IX, 4): “in the same motion, so to speak, of
one revolution of the sky, the real duration is the same, for the real being of such motion is the same … although
that entire duration, by comparison to an extrinsic time … could last longer or shorter according to the faster or
slower passing by of that motion.” In the original: “Nam in eodem motu, verbi gratia, unius circulationis caeli,
eadem est realis duratio, quia idem est reale esse talis motus … quamquam tota illa duratio per comparationem
ad extrinsecum tempus … magis vel minus durare posset iuxta velociorem vel tardiorem transitum illius motus.”
On the issue of periodicity and regularity, cf. also the discussion in (Janich 1980, pp. 180-9).
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RA will contain finitely many records, since it is a subset of the set containing all records in A,
which  is  itself  of  finite  cardinality.  On  the  other  hand,  V  could  be  of  countably infinite
cardinality, since it may well be that it is not possible to give a finite list of rules for drawing
inferences  from  records  to  propositions.  As  far  as  I  can  see,  PRA  will  also  be  of  finite
cardinality, since it seems that only finitely many propositions can be inferred from finitely
many records. In any case, this point makes no difference for the argument which follows.  
An assumption along the lines of A.3 is an essential requirement for scientific and everyday
realism, since arguably all our knowledge of the external world is based on records contained
in substances [cf. the discussion in Von Weizsäcker (2002, pp. 47- 78)].  
4. The asymmetry of the local arrow of time
4.1 The fixed past and the open future 
I will now argue that, on the theory of time laid out in section 2, as well as the epistemological
assumption  of  section  3,  we can  account  for  familiar  features  of  time  such as  its  linear,
unidirectional character, as well as the asymmetry between the fixed past and the open future.
To do so, let’s consider an ideal recorder A causally interacting with its surroundings, and let’s
assume,  furthermore,  that  A  establishes  a  local  parameter  t,  as  discussed  in  section  2.3.
Suppose that  A is in some stage  Atα, where  tα  > 0.  Atα  will in general bear records of causal
interactions (cf. identification  I.1), and being a substance, it can receive more such records
(assumptions A.1 and A.2). 
Because A counts, records in it are associated with locally measured times t (definition D.6).
Furthermore,  A counts on the basis of a repeated process affecting it, and so records in the
state Atα  which we are considering cannot be associated with numbers t greater than tα . They
must therefore be associated with numbers t less than tα , or possibly equal to it (more on this
problem below). For each time t less than tα  , there is a set RAt of records in A. This set will
contain at least one record, namely the one associated with the local time keeping process. It
may or may not contain further records r At. On assumption (A.3), from the existence of the
records contained in the set RAt, together with the rules of inference v contained in the set V,
the truth of some propositions associated with these records follows. We can therefore assign
the index t also to these propositions and call them pAt , and the set containing all of them and
only them will be called  PAt  . If, for some  t less than  tα,  RAt is empty apart from the record
associated with the local time keeping process itself, then, we may stipulate, PAt will contain
information only about the occurrence of time t, and nothing else. In any case, all times t less
than  tα  will be associated with sets  PAt, since such times have records, whereas all times  t
greater than tα  will not be associated with such sets, since these times have no records. This
association of local times with sets of records and sets of propositions has three noteworthy
consequences:
First, local time measured by A has a linear, as opposed to circular structure. For given two
locally measured times t and t’, even if the records rAt in RAt are indiscernible from the records
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rAt’ in RAt’, so that two type-identical sets of propositions PAt and PAt’ follow from them, PAt and
PAt’ are nevertheless not identical, because all propositions contained in PAt’ involve At’ rather
than At. In this way, every local time t is assigned a unique set PAt. Thus, even if exactly type-
identical  interactions  take  place  twice,  this  does  not  amount  to  the  recurrence  of  the
propositional content of a past time.
Second, for a state Atα of A, the propositional content associated with a local time t less than tα,
which is given by the set PAt , is fixed and unchangeable. Suppose that we are unhappy with a
proposition  (pAt)* contained in  PAt, and therefore wish to bring about that not-(pAt)* is true.
This is impossible, because (pAt)* is implied by true statements: first, the fact of the existence
of certain records which are contained in Atα  and which are associated with local time t, and
second, the rules contained in set V. Hence, (pAt)* is itself a true statement, and so not-(pAt)*
cannot be true. Nor can we change the propositional content of a local time t  less than tα  by
attempting to add a proposition to its set PAt. For this set, by assumption, contains all and only
the propositions which follow from the rules v in V and the existence of the records contained
in RAt , and therefore excludes any other propositions. The notion of adding some proposition,
call it  (pAt)+ , to  PAt therefore likewise entails that  (pAt)+ is both true and false. In sum, the
local past cannot be changed, because to do so implies a contradiction.
Third, the propositional content of local times  t  greater than  tα can be influenced. This is
because Atα is a state of A, and A, being a substance, can be influenced: it can acquire records
through causal interactions, records which in turn generate sets of propositions according to
assumption (A.3). However, for Atα, the propositional content of a time less than tα cannot be
changed in virtue of the argument in the preceding paragraph. On the other hand, no such
argument applies for times greater than  tα, because no records are contained in  Atα  for such
times. Thus, the local future is open: each time t greater than tα is not associated with a unique
P-set, but can be occupied by infinitely many such sets. The propositional content of such
times  can  therefore  be  thought  of  as  “branching”.  In  other  words,  given  the  basic
metaphysical  assumption  that  substances  can  receive  non-essential  properties,  it  is  not
astonishing that there is a branching set of possibilities which can occur to them. What needs
to  be  explained,  rather,  is  why there  are  no  such  branching  possibilities  for  the  past  as
measured locally.
What must be left open at this point is whether tα  itself is occupied by a set of records and a
corresponding set of propositions, i.e. whether it is the last point of the local determinate past
or the first point of the open future. On the one hand, according to definition (D.6),  Atα can
receive more records. This opens the possibility of several different states of Atα , which could
be ordered by the relation “before” according to definition (D.3). On the other hand, this is
unsatisfactory, because according to identification (I.1), there ought to be a unique state of A
associated with  tα. Dilemmas such as this typically plague thought about the present in the
philosophy of time. For if the present is associated with some event content, then it seems that
it must have some extension. But if it has extension, then there are earlier and later parts of
the  present,  which  contradicts  the  notion  of  the  present  as  containing  only  simultaneous
events [cf. Dainton (2010, pp. 95-102)]. In other words, the problem arises from associating
an infinitesimal point with event content. Operationally, the simplest solution seems to me to
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view all  events associated with the production of records in  Atα  ,  as well  as these records
themselves, as belonging to tα . As of local time tα itself, there is then no definite fact as to the
precise content of the set of records RAtα. This set is, so to speak, still under construction, and
therefore, so is the propositional content PAtα of tα .    
But what about substances which are not ideal recorders? Do they have a fixed past and an
open future? For substances which approximate ideal recorders well, such as ourselves, the
structure of time is the same as for the ideal recorder, but this is complicated by the fact that
some records for past local times are deleted, and that even preserved records cannot always
be accessed. However, as pointed out in section 2.1, it is still possible to reconstruct what an
ideal recorder would record through comparison with other recorders. In this way, the content
of P-sets for locally past times can be inferred. Defining time via the ideal recorder therefore
has the advantage of explaining the features of the passage of time as we experience it: Past
local times are associated with definite and unchangeable propositional content, even though
we may not always know that content. For future times, on the other hand, there is no definite
and unchangeable propositional content.   
What  has  been  laid  out  in  this  section  can  shed  light  on  the  difficult  problem  of  the
unidirectionality and anisotropy of time’s arrow, which is subject to so much debate in the
philosophy of physics. Why is it that we can move back and forth in space, but not in time,
that  we  can  only  act  “forward”  in  time  and  never  “backward”?  If  we  understand  time
operationally in terms of the ideal recorder,  it  is  the principle of non-contradiction which
accounts  for this  asymmetry:  since past local times are  occupied by  P-sets,  the notion of
revisiting a past point at time t entails that some statement (pAt)* both is and is not true. Thus,
if time moves anywhere, it can only move forward. I therefore propose that the reason for
time’s arrow is not to be found in irreversible physical phenomena such as the increasing
entropy of isolated systems. While these phenomena accompany time’s arrow, they are not its
underlying cause. To use Huw Price’s words, they belong not to the “genealogy problem” of
temporal asymmetry, but to the “taxonomy problem”, i.e. the problem of “asymmetries of
things  in  time” (1996, p. 17). Nor do we need the physically highly implausible concepts
employed  by  cosmic  A-theorists,  such  as  a  global  now  or  ontologically  privileged
hypersurfaces of simultaneity, in order to account for the passage of time. The tensed structure
of time, in short, is a real, but only local phenomenon.  
4.2 The now
A theory of local time also enables a new approach to the issue of the now, i.e. the question of
what the experienced “nowness” of events consists in and whether it is of any ontological
significance. It is frequently argued that, since the experienced now cannot be illusory, there
must be such a thing as “nowness” for the world as a whole [see e.g. D. W. Zimmerman
(2013, pp. 41-52); Unger & Smolin (2015, pp. 481-2)]. I propose, however, that we do not
need to choose between an absolute, global now on the one hand, and entirely dismissing the
concept of now as illusory on the other. The now associated with a state At of a recorder A can,
for example, be identified with the set of propositions PAt obtained from the set of records RAt ,
given a set of rules V. The now experienced by us as conscious agents will then be related, but
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not identical to PAt : As we in some state At are affected by the world, and ourselves affect the
world, we conclude the truth of some propositions concerning these interactions on the basis
of records contained in the set RAt . If we do so correctly, these propositions will be a proper
subset of PAt  . But PAt contains many more propositions since, being imperfect reasoners, we
cannot draw all conclusions which can be obtained from RAt and V.   
Which records rAt are produced in At is an invariant fact, since the production of these records
coincides at  the point  in  spacetime where  At  is  located.  Hence,  given a set  V of  rules  of
inference, PAt is likewise invariant, and unlike the notion of the global now, does not fall prey
to the relativization of temporal concepts brought about by spacetime physics. Thus, the now
of At, unlike the pre-relativistic notion of “all that is occurring in the entire world now”, is by
no means illusory but has a fundamentum in re, namely the content of PAt. Like the distinction
between past and future, the now too is a real but local phenomenon. 
5. Objections and comparisons
Having laid out a proposal for the derivation of “before”, of change, of local time and of its
asymmetric  character,  it  is  now  necessary  to  answer  objections  to  this  proposal  and  to
compare it in more detail with other accounts found in the literature. This will, I hope, both
corroborate the proposed account and make clearer what it is, and what it is not.
5.1 Charges of circularity
It may be objected that what I have developed in sections 2.1 to 2.3 is manifestly circular.
Doesn’t all this presuppose a dynamic and thoroughly temporal world? Specifically: Doesn’t
the notion of different states of substances presuppose a time in which these states exist in
temporal succession? Furthermore, are the notions of “causal interaction” and of substances
“affecting” each other even conceivable in the absence of time, and isn’t time a precondition
for such notions?9
Similar  objections  have  been  raised  against  Aristotle’s  definition  of  time  as  “number  of
motion (κίνησις) in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’”:  First,  it  is objected that the notion of
κίνησις, far from explaining time, presupposes it, since no κίνησις is possible unless there is
an underlying time in which it occurs. Second, the definition circularly employs the temporal
concepts of “before” and “after”.10 My definition of time in (D.7) closely follows Aristotle’s. I
9 Cf. Kant (1787, AA 57-8). In the translation of Meiklejohn (1855, p. 28), the relevant passage reads: “Time is a
necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all our intuitions. With regard to phaenomena in general, we
cannot think away time from them, and represent them to ourselves as out of and unconnected with time, but we
can quite well represent to ourselves time void of phaenomena. Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is all
reality  of  phaenomena  possible.  These  may all  be  annihilated  in  thought,  but  time  itself,  as  the  universal
condition of their possibility, cannot be so annulled.”
10 Roark (2011, p. 41). Cf. also the objection against a causal theory of time raised in (Whitrow 1963, p. 275):
“The basic difficulty confronting the causal theory is that the very essence of time lies in temporal succession …
unless the existence of successive states of phenomena is tacitly assumed it is impossible for the theory to yield
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spoke of “change” rather than “motion”, but the definition of change I proposed in (D.4), as
the acquisition or loss of an intrinsic property p, closely matches the Aristotelian term κίνησις,
which comprises the qualitative change of objects (ἀλλοίωσις) and their quantitative increase
(αὔξησις) or decrease (φθίσις).11 On the other hand, change as I defined it, unlike Aristotle’s
κίνησις, does not include an object’s motion through space (ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις), since an
object acquires no intrinsic property by such motion.12 
I  submit  that  a  neo-Aristotelian  view  of  time  escapes  the  aforementioned  charges  of
circularity: the notion of a set of states of some substance B is not intrinsically temporal, since
it can be defined without recourse to temporal notions. Given such a set, it  is possible to
define an ordering through the relation “before” between the states contained in this set by
using an ideal recorder A, as discussed in section 2.1. This, in turn, allows us to define change,
and in a next step, the quantification of change with the help of a recurring standard change
affecting a recorder A. Thus, change does not presuppose time, but rather, time can be defined
in terms of change. 
It  may  be  objected  that,  even  if  it  is  possible  to  define  a  set  of  states  of  a  substance
independently of time, it is inconceivable that such states in fact exist in the absence of time,
since for any substance B and property p, “B has p” and “B does not have p” cannot both be
true  simpliciter.  Instead,  they must  be  true  at  different  times.  Hence,  there  is  no  change
without time. I agree with this, but I do not believe that it stands in the way of a reduction of
time to change. Rather, I propose that time, as a number assigned to processes of change, is
precisely that respect  which makes it  possible to speak of a self-identical  substance  B as
existing with contradictory intrinsic properties, e.g. in state B-with-p at t1 and B-without-p at
t2. We might also say that the possession of contradictory properties by substances “spans”
time.      
What about the notions of causal interaction and of substances affecting each other causally?
Are they intrinsically temporal? This is a complex and much debated issue which to discuss at
length is beyond the scope of this article. I will therefore only provide a sketch of an answer
here. It seems to me that a strong case can be made, based on two pieces of evidence, that
causation is not intrinsically temporal. First, as Stephen Mumford and Rani L. Anjum (2011,
ch. 5) have argued, in my view convincingly, causation ought to be thought of as simultaneous
rather than diachronic. Mumford and Anjum use the example of colliding billiard balls, where
the causation takes place during the contact phase between the balls, not before or after it (pp.
108-9).  Such  examples  intimate  that  causes  do  not  precede  effects,  but  that  the  two  are
simultaneous.  To  this  I  would  add,  secondly,  that  ordinary  causal  interactions  between
macroscopic substances are electromagnetic in character and are mediated by the exchange of
photons.  This  is  true  of  interactions  involving  contact  forces,  such  as  pushing,  pulling,
temporal succession.”
11 Categories, ch. 14. Cf. also the discussion in [Roark (2011, pp. 63-7)].
12 Presumably, Aristotle took locomotion to be a species of κίνησις because he considered place (τόπος) to be an
accident of a substance. This classification may also have to do with the fact that Aristotle understood κίνησις
κατὰ τόπον as a type of causal interaction, since in Aristotelian physics a force must act on an object in order for
it to move.
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breaking,  squeezing,  and  so  on,  but  also  for  mechanical  waves,  which  involve
electromagnetically interacting molecules. But the exchange of photons does not seem to be a
temporal process: the spacetime interval between emission and absorption of a photon is zero
for  any distance  traveled,  and  the  very  notion  of  temporal  measurement,  which  requires
massive, composite objects, appears to have no meaning at the level of photons. Indeed, as E.
J. Zimmerman has argued, time is not a feature of the microscopic world, but a parameter
used for the extrinsic description thereof [Zimmerman (1981, see esp. pp. 492 and 496)]. In
my  view,  therefore,  the  relationship  between  causation  and  time  is  best  summarized  as
follows:  the  existence  of  different  states  of  substances  gives  rise  to  time,  and  the
electromagnetic interaction13 is responsible for the existence of these different states. But this
interaction  is  not  itself  something  intrinsically  temporal.  Hence,  the  notions  of  causally
affecting and of causal interaction do not presuppose time.     
None of all  this  should be read as a denial  of time and change, or as an argument for a
Parmenidean, static world. On the picture I propose, change and time are not illusory, but they
are derived notions rather than ontologically fundamental ones. 
5.2 The proposed causal theory does not rely on causal asymmetry
A further clarification should be added at this point: The view of time laid out in sections 2 to
4 can be called a causal theory of time because, on it, causal interactions between substances
account for time. This needs to be distinguished from the claim, often associated with the term
“causal theory of time”, that some form of asymmetry between causes and effects accounts
for temporal asymmetry. Several different models which employ this basic strategy can be
found in the literature: for example Hans Reichenbach’s mark method [Reichenbach (1958,
pp. 135-8), as cited in Grünbaum (1973, p. 180), which see for a discussion], D. H. Mellor’s
reduction  of  temporal  to  causal  order  (1998,  pp.  105-117),  or  Mathias  Frisch’s  argument
(2013) whereby temporal asymmetry can be understood in terms of causal and explanatory
models. A related account is that developed by Adolf Grünbaum, where the relationship of
temporal betweenness between events is explained in terms of an event’s being necessary for
the causal connectedness (“k-connectedness”) of two other events (1973, pp. 193-7).    
By contrast, I do not claim that temporal order follows from causal order, or that it is derived
from an asymmetric relationship between cause and effect. Rather, I claim that different states
of substances exist due to causal interactions, and that time can be constructed on this basis by
quantifying,  timelessly,  over  states  of  a  particular  type  of  substance,  namely  an
(approximately)  ideal  recorder.  This  leaves  open  whether  such  states  also  stand  in  an
asymmetric relation of causal dependence among each other,  and in which way events or
states  of  affairs  stand  in  such  relations.  These  questions  are  clearly  of  fundamental
philosophical importance, but their resolution, I claim, is not necessary in order to establish a
non-circular theory of local time.
5.3 The objection from general relativity
13 Other interactions which are associated with a zero spacetime interval may also come into play, but as far as I
can see, interactions which result in intrinsic change of substances are by and large electromagnetic.
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It can furthermore be objected that the very notion of causal interaction, on which the present
account of local time rests (by assumption A.2), is incompatible with general relativity (GR).
This objection can roughly be summarized as follows: The notion of causal interaction relies
on the transfer of energy. But statements about the transfer of energy from one system to
another are only warranted if an integral conservation law applies, thereby allowing us to keep
track of where in space, and by which systems, energy is gained or lost. As Erik Curiel (2011,
p. 20) succinctly puts it: 
The fact that it is always the same amount of energy that is gained and lost by interacting systems is supposed to
preclude the idea that energy can be created or destroyed, and so warrant the inference that energy is actually
transferred between interacting systems, as required.
Curiel then shows that such transfer accounts cannot be formulated in GR, because only a
differential (and hence, in a curved spacetime, covariant) conservation law, but no integral
conservation law applies in a general relativistic spacetime (pp. 20-28). 
I  agree  with  Curiel  that  GR  imposes  constraints  on  physicalist  accounts  of  causation.
However, it cannot be used to undermine all notions of causal interaction. The main reason for
this  is  that  GR is  fundamentally a  metric  theory.  Very roughly speaking,  its  fundamental
equation, the Einstein Field Equation, tells us how certain measurable quantities, spatial and
temporal ones, relate to the quantities contained in the stress-energy tensor. But measurement
is itself a type of causal interaction, either among the parts of an object (as in the case of a
ticking clock), or of an object with its environment (as in the case of length measurement).
Therefore GR, far from ruling out causal interactions, presupposes them, not merely as an
essential part of the context of discovery of the theory, but in the sense that terms fundamental
to  the theory cannot  be understood apart  from such interactions.  This  is  not  to  deny the
fundamental character of GR as a physical theory, which Curiel rightly draws attention to. As
far as we know, everything obeys the quantitative predictions of GR. However, the theory is
not metaphysically fundamental, insofar as it is based upon concepts defined independently of
the theory itself. 
What might be an account of the notion of causal interaction which is compatible with GR? It
is beyond the scope of this paper to give a fully-fledged account of causation. It suffices to
show that  accounts  are  possible  which  do not  depend  on integral  conservation  laws.  An
example is that given by Mumford and Anjum, for which I already stated my preference in
section (5.1).  On it, causal interactions are thought of as point-like, so that we do not need to
keep track of portions of energy over space and time in order to support a causal claim. To use
again the example of two colliding billiard balls—let’s call them a and b—it is “the impact
which is causally efficacious, not how ball a got to the point of impact” [Mumford and Anjum
(2011, p. 108)]. This being so, a necessary condition for the causal claim that  b  acquired
energy from  a  is  that  a  differential  equation  of  energy conservation—which in  a  general
relativistic spacetime will have a covariant form—is satisfied at the point of impact, whereas
an integral one which ensures that energy is conserved over a spatiotemporal volume is not
necessary. It may be objected that the collision event between a and b cannot be viewed as
strictly pointlike, but is itself extended in space and time. However, this event can be analyzed
in terms of smaller events involving the emission and absorption of photons by the molecules
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contained in a and b, for which it remains true that these events, not what happens before or
after them, are causally efficacious. Hence, an account of causation such as Mumford and
Anjum’s is not undermined by the absence of an integral conservation law in GR.
Suppose,  in  a next  step,  that  even a  differential  conservation equation failed to hold.  For
example, let’s imagine that, in a collision between two point-particles  a  and  b,  where  b  is
initially  at  rest,  the  total  momentum miraculously changes,  so that b  flies  off  with more
momentum than a had before impact. Clearly, this would preclude the causal claim whereby
b’s momentum came from a,  or at least that it did so entirely. But even then we would be
justified  in  applying  assumption  A.2:  b  acquired  its  momentum  by  interacting  with  its
environment, at least in the minimal sense of something distinct from b itself, which in this
case is the assumed miraculous source of the extra momentum. 
In sum, assumption A.2 is in no way undermined by GR. The theory does not rule out the very
notion of causal interaction, but only particular types of physicalist accounts thereof.14
5.4 Comparison with Janich’s protophysics of time
The present account of time is consonant with the operationalist approach of the Erlangen
School, and in particular Peter Janich’s protophysics of time (1980), in the sense that time is
understood in terms of a quantification of change with the help of a repeated standard change.
The principal difference lies in the derivation: Janich starts his account of time measurement
with change and motion as notions known by example from everyday experience (p. 142),
and  therefore  not  in  need  of  further  analysis.  After  a  detailed  geometric  discussion  of
comparisons between different locomotions (pp. 151-179), Janich then introduces repeated
change, also known by example (p. 192) as the basis for quantification of change. From this,
Janich provides rigorous, and in my view helpful, definitions of time measuring devices and
of their regularity and constancy, based on a distinction between a device itself and a part of it
which functions as a time indicator (pp. 194-210). The relations “earlier” and “later”, as well
as the asymmetry between past and future are, on Janich’s account, consequences of time
measurement so introduced, and therefore do not stand in need of a further derivation (pp.
214-5). 
My proposal, by contrast, is to start with the definition of “before” in terms of changeless
notions, and from there on to derive the notions of change and of a repeated standard change
as the basis for time measurement, as carried out in sections 2.1-2.3. Also, I have proposed a
derivation of the irreversibility of time in section 4 based, not on measurement alone, but on
propositions and their truth values. Janich’s account of clocks and chronometry is much more
detailed than my rather minimalistic proposal of defining time in terms of several instances of
a property  r*  in an ideal recorder  A. But the two approaches for time measurement can be
combined, for example by defining repeated instances of records of the same type r* in A as
records of a time measuring device, as construed by Janich, in A’s vicinity. 
14 Similarly,  Curiel  points  out  that  his  critique  does not  apply to  all  accounts  of  causation,  but  only ones
whereby “causality is a physical relation holding among physical entities” and which “take the transfer (and the
propagation) of energy to play the most important role in constituting the causal relation” (p. 2). I went further in
arguing that even a transfer account is viable, as long as it is based on point-like interactions. But this does not
exclude that other accounts of causation, not based on the transfer of energy, may be viable.  
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5.5 Comparison with the IGUS-model of temporal asymmetry
The physicist James B. Hartle proposes that the asymmetry of time is best understood in terms
of IGUSes, i.e. “information gathering and utilizing systems” (2008, p. 1). This approach is
consonant with what I have laid out in section 4, where the difference between past and future
was explained in terms of records contained in a substance and propositions derived from
them. There are, however, important differences: Hartle’s account presupposes, first, a time
interval in which the IGUS erases old images in its memory and acquires new ones (p. 2), and
second, a direction of time defined by the increasing entropy of the universe (pp. 6-8). Hence,
a pre-existing spacetime structure in which the IGUS lives is assumed. In Craig Callender’s
words:
Is  this  [the  IGUS]  enough  for  passage?  I  think  it  probably  isn’t.  Ultimately with  IGUS we  have  a  robot
instantiating various asymmetric processes and maintaining an asymmetric correlation structure with the outside
world… [However] we don’t have movement yet, the  whoosh and the  whiz.  Nothing seems to “crawl up” the
IGUS’s worldline, thereby making time flow… The memory asymmetry doesn’t provide us with our desired
feature of something moving through time. [Callender (2017, p. 247)] 
The account offered in this article, if successful, solves this problem by deriving the notions
of  “before”  and  of  change  themselves  in  terms  of  a  recorder.  Thus,  it  does  not  need  to
presuppose  an  existing  temporal  structure  in  order  to  explain  the  temporal  asymmetry
“experienced”, so to speak, by the IGUS. A further difference is that, on Hartle’s account, it is
in  principle  possible  for  a  robot to  organize its  memory in  different  ways relative to  the
direction of time, e.g. it could remember its future (pp. 8-9). By contrast, I have proposed
(section 4.1) reconstructing the familiar notion of the “past” through records contained in a
recorder A and the propositions which can be derived from them, and the “future” in terms of
A’s ability to acquire more records. Hence, on my account, a recorder cannot in principle
remember its future.
6. A relativistically correct model of time beyond A-theory and
the block universe
If  the above proposal  for  a  real  but  local  passage of time succeeds,  the conflict  between
relativity theory and the experienced passage of time, which appears so clearly in the work,
for example, of Gödel or of Unger and Smolin, dissolves. Essentially, this is because this
proposal views time as quantification of change, where change, as argued, can be defined
independently of temporal notions. Only local causal interactions affecting substances and
counting recorders are needed for this proposal, whereas the concept of time as a succession
of global nows can be altogether dispensed with. Note that such a theory of time makes no
statements about fundamental physics, since it is based on concepts which only apply at a
relatively macroscopic level, in particular such as relate to substances and their properties, as
well as on metaphysical arguments involving propositions. On this theory, it is not surprising
that it is hard to account for temporal asymmetry at the level of fundamental physics.  
It is now possible to spell out the consequences of such a theory for the philosophy of time:
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I submit that the local past along a worldline is fixed, and the future open since, if time is
understood operationally in terms of recorders, there is a unique and unchangeable P-set for
any past time, but infinitely many possibilities for the content of the P-set of any future time.
Therefore,  the  most  fitting  metaphor  for  this  model  of  local  time  is  not  the  tree,  whose
branches separate at the present and represent the possible future courses of events, but rather
something like a  horsetail, a plant where there is branching from every node above a certain
threshold. On this model, the experienced difference between the tenses is not illusory. To
account for this, we do not, however, need the classical A-theoretical picture whereby events
change their ontological status as time passes, in such a way that future events become present
ones, and then past ones. Instead, as far as the ontology of events themselves is concerned, we
need only to distinguish between possible and actual ones. That an actual event x is past for
some stage Atα of a recorder A means that a real relation between Atα and x holds, namely that
the proposition describing  x is in one of  Atα’s  P-sets. This picture of local time asymmetry
matches our everyday experience as conscious agents: at any stage of our existence, we can
actualize states of affairs, and can only meaningfully deliberate about actualizing future ones,
or possibly present ones, whereas the past cannot be revisited in principle. 
However,  we  cannot  apply  the  predicates  past,  present,  and  future  to  stages  of  the
development  of the universe as a whole.  Evolutionary cosmology and the notion that  the
world as a whole undergoes a development from earlier  to later stages can in a sense be
upheld, at least insofar as these stages can be put into a total and directed order, or B-series,
by using cosmic time, which is uniquely suited for an account of the development of the
observable universe, as outlined briefly in section 1. However, the evolution of the cosmos
does  not  itself  form an  A-series,  because  no  frame-independent  temporal  ordering  of  all
events  is  available  for  the  construction  of  equivalence  classes,  and  hence  ontologically
privileged hypersurfaces of simultaneity or a global present separating the past of the cosmos
from its future are rendered impossible.
As for the ontology of time itself, this article made the case that temporal notions such as the
relation “before”, time intervals, past, present, and future, are best understood operationally in
terms  of  substances  and  their  records,  as  well  as  P-sets.  On this  picture,  time  is  neither
understood as  in  substantivalism,  i.e.  as  a  substance  existing  independently of  measuring
operations, nor as a merely subjective or illusory phenomenon, but instead, to use an ancient
phrase, as an  ens rationis cum fundamento in re:  an entity of reason with a foundation in
reality.  
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